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To a large extent, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought the United
States into uncharted territory on a number of fronts. Despite the fact that
the steps the federal and state governments take to curtail the spread of
the viral infection are presumably taken in the best interest of public
health, governmental actions and actors must comply with the U.S.
Constitution. Some public health measures, such as stay-at-home orders,
restrict the exercise of personal freedoms ranging from the rights to travel
and freely associate to the ability to gather in places of worship for
religious services. Enforcement of these public health orders falls to
police. But police authority to stop and question people—even during a
pandemic—must nonetheless comply with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Given the compelling governmental interest in limiting the
spread of COVID-19, reasonable police actions to enforce public health
orders are likely constitutional under several theories, even if stops are
made without particularized suspicion. Of those, however, the special
needs doctrine is best suited for this purpose because it is the approach
most likely to safeguard civil liberties after the pandemic ends.
The U.S. Supreme Court has only rarely addressed the extent to
which the police power of the state outweighs individual rights and
liberties in the context of governmental efforts to stop the spread of
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infectious diseases. The most instructive case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
dates back to the smallpox epidemic at the dawn of the twentieth century. 1
In overruling a pastor’s claim that a mandatory smallpox vaccination
violated his constitutional rights, the Court carefully stated that individual
liberties “may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected
to [restraints] . . . by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general
public may demand.” 2 This precedent, now 115 years old, predates laws
and judicial opinions aimed at maximizing religious freedoms under
which the outcome in Jacobson might differ today. 3 But whether religious
freedoms may be significantly curtailed during a pandemic under public
health orders designed to save human lives is not the only open question
from a constitutional perspective. For example, to what degree does due
process restrain the power of the state to quarantine people merely
suspected of being infected with the disease? 4 To what extent may the
government conduct surveillance for “contact tracing” purposes (such as
tracking movements via cell phones) and, in doing so, invade people’s
privacy? 5 Does the power of eminent domain allow the government to
seize private facilities for quarantine purposes and, if so, must
compensation be provided? 6 And, most relevant to this Article, to what
extent does the Fourth Amendment restrain the power of law enforcement
to stop people who are out of their homes when a public health order has
directed people to shelter-in-place during a pandemic?

1. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
2. Id. at 29.
3. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493 (2020); FLA. STAT. ch. 761.01-.05 (2020); see also
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating an
ordinance banning animal sacrifice as part of religious ceremonies on the grounds that the law targeted
practitioners of Santeria); Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that because a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability, states may prohibit
sacramental peyote use and, accordingly, may also deny unemployment benefits to persons who were
fired for such use); cf. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106–
274, § 2, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.).
4. For an analysis, see Michael R. Ulrich & Wendy K. Mariner, Quarantine and the Federal
Role in Epidemics, 71 SMU L. REV. 391 (2018)
5. See Simon Chandler, Coronavirus Could Infect Privacy and Civil Liberties Forever,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/2020/03/23/coronaviruscould-infect-privacy-and-civil-liberties-forever/#71aa2b64365d [https://perma.cc/DFU5-9X6F].
6. David G. Tucker & Alfred O. Bragg, III, Florida’s Law of Storms: Emergency
Management, Local Government, and the Police Power, 30 STETSON L. REV. 837 (2001).
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I. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ORDERS
The Commerce Clause grants the federal government limited legal
authority to take measures to prevent the spread of diseases from foreign
countries and between states. 7 Pursuant to that constitutional provision,
Congress enacted the Public Health Service Act in 1944. 8 The U.S.
Department of Health and Humans Services, which houses the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), has enacted, and periodically
amended, various regulations under the authority of that legislation. 9
Collectively, these federal laws permit the U.S. government to issue
isolation and quarantine orders to persons arriving in the United States
and traveling between states. 10 Thus, federal authority is somewhat
limited in this arena. 11 By contrast, the police powers of the states—the
authority to impose restrictions on private rights for the sake of public
welfare, order, and security which is enshrined in state constitutions under
the authority reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution—vests primary authority to state and local governments to
order people into isolation or quarantine for public health purposes. 12
Although state laws governing the exercise of police powers for
health emergencies vary significantly, 13 most states’ laws vest public
health directors or similar officials the authority to issue public health
orders designed to stop the spread of contagious diseases. But these orders
are allowed only under limited circumstances that not only involve certain
types of danger to the public health, but also that could not be controlled
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33201
AND
STATE
QUARANTINE
AND
ISOLATION
AUTHORITY
1
(2014),
FEDERAL
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33201.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMD7-3XRF].
8. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, § 361, 58 Stat. 703 (1944) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–72).
9. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 70–71 (2020).
10. Isolation “separates sick people with a quarantinable communicable disease from people
who are not sick,” whereas quarantine “separates and restricts the movement of people who were
exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become sick.” Legal Authorities for Isolation and
CDC.GOV
(Feb.
24,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/
Quarantine,
aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html [https://perma.cc/R4ZS-AYL4].
11. COLE, supra note 7, at 6 (“While the federal government has authority to authorize
quarantine and isolation under certain circumstances, the primary authority for quarantine and
isolation exists at the state level as an exercise of the state’s police power.”)
12. Id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Lawrence O. Gostin, The
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism,
13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 24 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that states have a deep
reservoir of public health powers, conceiving of state police powers as an ‘immense mass of
legislation in which inspection laws, quarantine laws, and health laws of every description . . . are
components of this mass’”) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 203 (internal alterations omitted)).
13. COLE, supra note 7, at 6.
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through less restrictive alternatives. 14 Stay-at-home orders and shelter-inplace orders (SaHOs/SiPOs) can be considered as variations of state
isolation and quarantine authority to stop the spread of disease.
Alternatively, SaHOs/SiPOs may be viewed as stemming from broader
executive powers during emergencies, 15 especially in the more than forty
states that have adopted some variation of the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act, drafted by the CDC in 2001 after the September 11th
attacks. 16 Either way, the “en masse” lockdowns attendant to
SaHOs/SiPOs impinge on so many constitutional rights that they will
likely be challenged on a variety of grounds, although most experts agree
most such challenges will fail. 17
State laws provide either civil or criminal punishments for violation
of public health orders that range from fines to terms of imprisonment. 18
Most jurisdictions, however, use criminal penalties only as a last resort.
As a spokesperson for the San Francisco Police Department states, “We
are not interested in using a criminal justice approach for a public health
challenge. . . . This is about educating the public about voluntary
compliance.” 19 As Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo noted, police
departments across the United States have largely been taking a similar
approach because it is essential that police–community relationships be

14. Nat’l Conf. of State Leg, State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes (2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BZ22-M8XH] [hereinafter “NCSL, Quarantine Statutes”].
15. For example, the emergency management statute in Tennessee grants the governor the
authority to suspend state business; order evacuations; set quarantine areas; limit the sale of certain
goods; use the national guard to distribute “supplies, equipment, and materials”; “commandeer . . .
private property . . . necessary to cope with the emergency”; and “take measures concerning the
conduct of civilians, the movement and cessation of movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic . . .
[and] the calling of public meetings and gatherings . . . .” TENN. CODE § 58-2-107 (2020).
16. For an in-depth discussion of that model statute by its primary author, see Gostin, supra
note 12, passim.
17. Arizona State University law professor James Hodge opined that in light of the broad
governmental authority during a public health crisis, such challenges would only succeed as applied
to some “truly egregious practice.” Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawsuits over Coronavirus Quarantines
J.
(Mar.
18,
2020),
Are
Unlikely
to
Succeed,
Experts
Say.
ABA
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/suits-over-coronavirus-quarantines-unlikely-to-succeedexperts-say [https://perma.cc/P5QY-7PWM]. But Georgetown University law professor Lawrence
Gostin cautioned that there are dramatic distinctions between isolation and quarantine of infected and
suspected infected persons and widespread SaHOs/SiPOs. Id.
18. NCSL, Quarantine Statutes, supra note 14.
19. Betsy Pearl, Lea Hunter, Kenny Lo, Ed Chung, The Enforcement of COVID-19 Stay-atHome Orders, CNTR. AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/criminal-justice/news/2020/04/02/482558/enforcement-COVID-19-stay-home-orders/
[https://perma.cc/BH8M-D5QG].
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strong at this critical time. 20 Nonetheless, when people flout
SaHOs/SiPOs, police have little choice but to exercise their law
enforcement authority.
II. POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ORDERS
Public health orders such as SaHOs/SiPOs are incredibly tricky to
enforce. This is especially true in the United States during the COVID-19
pandemic for two reasons.
First and foremost, some jurisdictions have not issued legallybinding orders to stay inside. Rather some state and local governments
have issued guidelines that rely on the public’s voluntary cooperation. 21
In such locales, formal legal orders are not issued “unless a person breaks
that initial request.” 22 But even when legally-enforceable orders are in
place, as professor of law and global health Polly Price explained,
enforcement of these orders often falls on “the honor system.” 23
Second, public health officials cannot arrest people or force them to
stay in a particular location. Thus, enforcing SaHOs/SiPOs falls to the
police. Law enforcement around the globe struggle with how far they
should go in enforcing such orders as applied to everyday, ordinary
behaviors. 24 Unlike in other countries where police can respond to
emergency legislation that empowers them to enforce lockdown orders
aggressively, 25 in the United States, enforcement of public health orders
is complicated by the Fourth Amendment since that constitutional
provision limits police authority to stop, question, frisk, or arrest people
absent certain quanta of proof. 26

20. Kevin Johnson & Richard Wolf, Enforcing the Shutdown: Law enforcement grapples with
policing stay-at-home orders, social distancing, quarantines, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/02/coronavirus-police-fines-jail-breakingstay-home-orders/5104704002/ [https://perma.cc/JW98-LTZ2].
21. Talal Ansari & Brianna Abbott, U.S. Considers How to Enforce Coronavirus Quarantines,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-considers-how-to-enforcecoronavirus-quarantines-11583963653 [https://perma.cc/9BFJ-Z8XP].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Damien Cave & Abdi Latif Dahir, How Far Should Police Go in Enforcing Coronavirus
Lockdowns? N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/australia/
coronavirus-police-lockdowns.html [https://perma.cc/AY6M-DGWB].
25. Id.
26. See generally MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC (2016).
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. 27
There is no formula for determining reasonableness; rather, reasonableness is an inherently flexible standard that takes into account all of the
circumstances surrounding the actions of law enforcement officials.
Generally, though, absent abusive conduct or behavior that “shocks the
conscience” . . . , the reasonableness of search or seizure will turn, in
large part, on three factors: (1) whether law enforcement officers trespassed against a defendant’s property rights; (2) whether law enforcement officers violated the defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy; and (3) whether the actions of law enforcement complied with the
requirements of the Warrants Clause. 28

But the Supreme Court has recognized numerous exceptions to
requirements of probable cause and warrants in the ground of the
“reasonableness” of police actions, usually by “weighing the utility of a
particular kind of search or seizure in serving some ‘special law
enforcement interest’ against the degree of intrusiveness entailed in the
particular technique.” 29
When people voluntarily consent to isolation, monitoring, and
treatment, the usual strictures of the Fourth Amendment are not
implicated. 30 But when people do not comply with public health orders,
or if there are bona-fide questions as to whether they are in compliance
with the exceptions to such orders, police are called upon to act in ways
that are designed to stop the spread of contagious diseases. In such
circumstances, law enforcement officers may need to stop and question
people in ways that would otherwise be impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment—namely without any individualized suspicion as normally

27. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
28. STEPHEN S. OWEN, HENRY F. FRADELLA, TOD W. BURKE, & JERRY JOPLIN, FOUNDATIONS
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 243 (3d ed. 2020) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (holding that a search occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when
law enforcement physically intrude on a constitutionally protected area); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that even in the absence of a physical trespass, a search occurs for
Fourth Amendment purposes when law enforcement violates a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that police conduct that “shocks
the conscience” violates due process).
29. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1648 (1998).
30. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (noting that the prohibition on
warrantless searches and seizures does not apply “to situations in which voluntary consent has been
obtained”).
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required for police stops. 31 Given the compelling governmental interest in
limiting the spread of COVID-19, reasonable police actions to enforce
SaHOs/SiPOs are likely constitutional under several theories, but several
of these approaches might expand police authority in ways that have the
potential to encroach on civil liberties after the pandemic ends.
A. Terry and Reasonable Suspicion in Light of Asymptomatic Persons
Although probable cause is usually necessary to conduct a search,
seize evidence, or make an arrest, the Supreme Court has created several
notable exceptions to this rule. The one most relevant to the enforcement
of SaHOs/SiPOs allows police to stop people based on reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity—a lower standard of proof than probable
cause. 32 Stops are not the same as arrests; they are brief, limited
investigative detentions that do not ordinarily involve any intention to
arrest a person, whereas formal arrests require that law enforcement
officers intend to take someone into custody. 33 Still, to comply with the
requirements of Terry v. Ohio, should law enforcement have reasonable
suspicion that someone is violating a public health order before stopping
them?
Relying on various studies or statements from public health officials,
news sources typically report that between 25% and 50% of people who
contract COVID-19 are asymptomatic and, therefore, might have no idea
that they are spreading the disease by being “out and about.” 34 A review
of twenty-one research reports conducted by The Centre for EvidenceBased Medicine at Oxford University reported that although “between 5%
and 80% of people testing positive” for COVID-19 may be asymptomatic,
there is “not a single reliable study to determine the number of
asymptotics.” 35
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (recognizing that warrantless stops may occur upon
reasonable, articulable suspicion); see also WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 26, at 43–79.
32. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
33. E.g., Bartlett v. State, 249 S.W.3d 658, 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); see generally Thomas
K. Clancy, What Constitutes an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL.
L. REV. 129 (2003) (analyzing the differences between arrests and other type of detentions).
34. Roz Plater, As Many as 50 Percent of People with COVID-19 Aren’t Aware They Have the
Virus, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/50-percent-of-peoplewith-COVID19-not-aware-have-virus [https://perma.cc/443W-FAZA]; Aylin Woodward, It’s
Estimated 1 in 4 Coronavirus Carriers Could Be Asymptomatic. Here’s What We Know, SCIENCE
ALERT (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.sciencealert.com/here-s-what-we-know-so-far-about-those-whocan-pass-corona-without-symptoms [https://perma.cc/QMY7-JXAZ].
35. Carl Heneghan, Jon Brassey, & Tom Jefferson, COVID-19: What Proportion Are
Asymptomatic?, CEBM (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.cebm.net/COVID-19/COVID-19-whatproportion-are-asymptomatic/ [https://perma.cc/8WWP-QSW5].
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Given that so many people may be infected with the novel
coronavirus and be completely asymptomatic, it may be “reasonable” to
assume that everyone could be infected with it. Indeed, public health
officials like Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation President Stephen
Prescott have warned people to “[a]ssume you’re contagious, even if you
feel fine.” 36 Put differently, there might be reasonable suspicion to justify
stops of all persons who are outside their homes when SaHOs/SiPOs are
in effect. Such an approach is arguably consistent with Terry v. Ohio,
provided that the stop is brief and limited in scope to investigating whether
a person is in transit for a permitted purpose, such as for medical reasons,
to buy groceries, and to work in essential services. 37 Admittedly, this
interpretation of Terry would expand law enforcement authority in ways
that significantly encroach on Fourth Amendment liberties. To prevent
what economist Robert Higgs refers to as a “ratchet effect” to explain
expanding governmental authority during crises in ways that not only
exceed preexisting norms, 38 but also tend to remain as the “new normal”
after the crisis subsides, 39 SaHOs/SiPOs should be justified using Fourth
Amendment doctrines other than trying to fit such enforcement within the
Terry framework. Indeed, there are a number of doctrines that may justify
suspicionless stops from a constitutional perspective.
B.

Exigent Circumstances

A narrow range of circumstances that permit warrantless searches
and seizures for criminal investigatory purposes, such as to prevent the
imminent destruction of evidence or to apprehend a dangerous fleeing
felon during hot pursuit. 40 But true emergencies can also justify actions
36. K. Butcher, “Assume you’re contagious, even if you feel fine,” Health experts urging
Oklahomans to be cautious for sake of others, KFOR.COM (Mar. 19, 2020), https://kfor.com/health/
coronavirus/assume-youre-contagious-even-if-you-feel-fine-health-experts-urging-oklahomans-tobe-cautious-for-sake-of-others/ [https://perma.cc/R3Q2-DDJG].
37. California Executive Order N-33-20. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://COVID19.ca.gov/
img/Executive-Order-N-33-20.pdf. [https://perma.cc/A6HN-D77Z].
38. ROBERT HIGGS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CRISIS OPPORTUNISM 3–4 (Mercatus Pol’y
Series Primer No. 11, 2009), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Mercatus_Policy_SeriesHIGGS.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW2M-CXNB].
39. E.g., David S. Damato, Civil liberties under attack during COVID-19, THE HILL (Apr. 8,
2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/491731-civil-liberties-under-attack-during-COVID-19
[https://perma.cc/X8T5-P3XQ]; David French, Lata Nott, & Jeffrey Rosen, Civil Liberties and
COVID-19, WE THE PEOPLE PODCAST (Apr. 2, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/podcast/civil-liberties-and-COVID-19 [https://perma.cc/8NNL-DDQV].
40. JOHN N. FERDICO, HENRY F. FRADELLA, & CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 254–57 (12th ed. 2015); see also Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984).
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that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment in response to threats
to safety. For example, first responders are permitted to enter a burning
building to fight the fire and rescue persons who may be trapped inside.41
Police may forcibly enter a private home without a warrant in response to
situations “when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need
of immediate aid.” 42 And although the U.S. Supreme Court held that
administrative searches by municipal health and safety inspectors
constitute significant intrusions upon interests protected by Fourth
Amendment and, therefore, require a warrant, the Court was careful to say
that exigent circumstances such as the seizure of tainted food, preventing
exposure to smallpox, and destroying tubercular cattle would allow
warrantless entry for an emergency inspection.43
Lower courts have expanded the exigent circumstances exception in
threats to safety context to a variety of circumstances including
responding to calls for emergency medical treatment, searching for
missing persons (especially in response to reported kidnappings),
stopping an assault or burglary in progress, responding to gunfire, and
responding to information concerning the whereabouts of an explosive
device or volatile chemicals. 44 In such contexts, aiding people in
objectively reasonable emergency situations distinguishes such actions
from warrantless stops, entries, and searches conducted law
enforcement/criminal investigatory purposes.
The COVID-19 pandemic no doubt presents exigent circumstances
on a social level. But whether people being outside their home after the
issuance of SaHOs/SiPOs, however, qualifies as an exigent circumstance
for Fourth Amendment purposes is doubtful. It is unlikely that courts
would find the exigent circumstances exception applicable in the
contagious disease context for at least three reasons. First, courts tend to
interpret the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment
quite narrowly. 45 Second, other than situations in which police,
firefighters, and paramedics are responding to calls for emergency
medical treatment, courts generally require police to have probable cause
that some underlying criminal activity is transpiring when applying the

41. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
42. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
43. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
44. For a review, see John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and
Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433 (1999).
45. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749–50 (“Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that
exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully delineated,’ . . . .”); see also
Decker, supra note 44.
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exigent circumstances doctrine. 46 Indeed, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the
Supreme Court specifically noted its “hesitation in finding exigent
circumstances” even when probable cause existed to arrest someone for a
relative minor offense. 47 Thus, whether the doctrine would ultimately be
held to justify stops made without any particularized suspicion seems
dubious. Finally, even when violations of SaHOs/SiPOs constitute
criminal offenses and, therefore, being out of the home might arguably
establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause, unlike in many of the
emergency situations previously discussed, the prevention of viral
transmission presents a more speculative type of harm than those
presented by burning buildings, active gunfire, or assaults in progress.
Accordingly, a different doctrine might be better suited to underpin the
constitutionality of police stops to enforce SaHOs/SiPOs during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
C.

Individuals in Transit

A strong argument can be made that law enforcement officers are
permitted to stop people while traveling in order to enforce public health
orders. The clearest example of such authority is at international borders
or their functional equivalents, such as international airline terminals,
cruise ship terminals, or some other place where someone may be stopped
for the first time upon entering the country. “Border searches are not only
a part of maintaining the sovereignty of the country by controlling the
flow of both people and articles into or out of the country but also play a
vital role in maintaining national security.” 48 As a result, “routine searches
of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement
of reasonable suspicion . . . .” 49
Of course, the reasons supporting suspicionless searches at
international borders is not directly applicable when police stop persons
on foot, bicycles, or in cars already within the United States. Federal
regulations specifically authorize the “apprehension” of people if the
“individual is reasonably believed to be infected with a quarantinable
communicable disease” when such person is moving between states.50 But
just because someone is moving across state lines does not give law
enforcement reasonable grounds to believe that the person is infected.
46. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750.
47. Id.
48. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 40, at 232.
49. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (quoting United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
50. 42 C.F.R. § 70.6(A)(1) (2020).
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Thus, a different legal doctrine that is not dependent on particularized,
reasonable suspicion may be needed to justify such actions when people
are engaged in interstate travel. Moreover, that doctrine would also need
to apply to stops of persons engaged in travel within a state or locality.
The special needs doctrine seems best suited for such circumstances.
D.

Special Needs

There are certain types of searches that, when conducted for a special
need unrelated to the detection of criminal activity, not only excuse the
usual requirement of a warrant, but also can occur without probable cause.
Under the special needs doctrine, such searches are evaluated under the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. The applicability of
this exception to normal Fourth Amendment standards depending on
whether there is a “special need that involves a real and significant
problem ‘beyond the normal need for law enforcement’ to detect crime.” 51
Under this doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned searches of
public employees’ workspaces by their supervisors to detect work-related
misconduct; 52 random drug testing of certain types of governmental
employees to promote public safety; 53 and searches of persons entering
correctional institutions to prevent the entry of contraband. 54
Importantly, the Supreme Court has even relied on the special needs
doctrine to allow searches and seizures that are not even supported by
reasonable suspicion, the reduced level of proof that is normally required
to conduct a stop-and-frisk pursuant to Terry v. Ohio and its progeny. 55

51. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 40, at 218; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313
(1997).
52. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
757 (2010) (reasoning that when a public employee “has a legitimate privacy expectation, an
employer’s intrusion on that expectation ‘for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under
all the circumstances.’”) (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725–26).
53. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671–72 (1989) (holding that
the drug testing of armed law enforcement agents involved in drug interdiction efforts presents a
special need that justifies suspicionless urinalyses); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to
ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a
government office, school, or prison, ‘likewise presents “special needs” beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
54. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 330–
40 (2012) (reasoning that correctional security needs justify searches of arrestees for whom there is
no reasonable suspicion of possession of concealed weapon or other contraband).
55. See WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 26, at 43–79.
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For example, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 56 the Court
upheld a program that established roadside sobriety checkpoints without
a warrant or any particularized suspicion. “Key to the Court’s reasoning
was the fact that a significant public safety need met by these motor
vehicle stops outweighed the minimal intrusions such stops caused to
drivers’ privacy rights.” 57 The Court also upheld mandatory drug testing
of student athletes in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 58 finding no
violation of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in spite of the
suspicionless nature of such testing because it served the goal of
preventing teenage drug use. The Court even extended this line of
reasoning in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v.
Earls to permit the random, suspicionless drug testing of all students who
engaged extracurricular after-school activities. 59
The U.S. Supreme Court has never confronted the issue of police
authority to conduct suspicionless stops in the context of disease
prevention. But in light of the aforementioned rulings applying the special
needs doctrine, there is high likelihood that the compelling public health
goal of preventing of the spread of a potentially lethal contagious disease
would qualify as a special need justifying warrantless and suspicionless
stops of people who are “out and about” when SaHOs/SiPOs are in effect.
Still, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers
need to execute such stops reasonably.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of concerns about the Ebola virus, the United States took
steps to update many public health protocols, especially those concerning
isolation and quarantine. In reviewing the substantive and procedural due
process concerns raised by these laws and regulations, law and public
health professors Michael R. Ulrich and Wendy K. Mariner wrote the
following:
There is no evidence that the public is reluctant to cooperate with public
health officials, especially in the midst of an outbreak, as long as the
public has confidence in official recommendations. But public officials
must earn that trust. This requires public health officials to obtain accurate information, communicate honestly with the public, and ensure that

56.
57.
58.
59.

496 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1990).
FERDICO ET AL., supra note 40, at 221.
515 U.S. 646, 660–65 (1995).
536 U.S. 822, 830–32 (2002).

2020]

ENFORCE STAY-AT-HOME ORDERS

13

the public has the resources necessary to cooperate with reasonable recommendations. 60

Sadly, public trust in governmental communications during the COVID19 pandemic may be justifiably low in light of the conflicting information
that citizens have received from public health officials, who sounded the
alarm over the novel coronavirus, and President Trump, who repeatedly
downplayed the severity of the outbreak. 61 The confusion that results from
such mixed messages compounds the difficulties that police face as first
responders during an international health emergency. Thus, in addition to
citizens voluntarily cooperating with SaHOs/SiPOs for their own good
and that of their families and community members, it is essential that the
messaging from federal authorities, ranging from the CDC to the White
House, communicate accurate information.
It is equally important that people be respectful of police at this
difficult time. Law enforcement officers are on the front lines of the
pandemic. Police put their lives on the line each day. As with other first
responders, the current threats to police officers’ lives are particularly
palpable since an invisible viral infection threatens their safety above and
beyond those they face in ordinary times. Shortages of personal protective
equipment compound the health dangers officers face right now. Rather
than challenging police who stop pedestrians or drivers to inquire about
compliance with SaHOs/SiPOs, people should do their best to thank
officers who are looking out for our safety, health, and welfare during
particularly challenging times.
That being said, police must be careful to honor people’s
constitutional rights during the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, this is a
particularly important time for putting the best community policing
strategies into practice. Officers need to communicate the importance of
compliance with SaHOs/SiPOs, especially to people who may not
understand how asymptomatic people can nonetheless transmit the novel
coronavirus.
Finally, criminal court personnel should consider the long-term
consequences of challenging, defending, or upholding stops to investigate

60. Ulrich & Mariner, supra note 4, at 429.
61. Brad Brooks, Like the flu? Trump’s coronavirus messaging confuses public, pandemic
researchers say, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirusmixed-messages/like-the-flu-trumps-coronavirus-messaging-confuses-public-pandemic-researcherssay-idUSKBN2102GY [https://perma.cc/6KNW-7FAT]; Intelbrief: COVID-19 Exposes Fault Lines
in U.S. Public Trust and Government, THE SOUFAN CENTER (Apr. 3, 2020)
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-COVID-19-exposes-fault-lines-in-u-s-public-trust-andgovernment/ [https://perma.cc/24U5-595F].
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compliance with SaHOs/SiPOs using Fourth Amendment doctrines that
have the potential to erode constitutional rights in the future. The special
needs doctrine is the approach least likely to do so. Accordingly, that
approach to upholding police enforcement of public health orders ought
to be the preferred one during this time of pandemic.

